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
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DD/I

DATE: 10 November 1955

FROM : AD/RR

SUBJECT: Short Brief on Soviet Naval Construction



1. In response to your request of a few days ago, I am submitting the enclosed brief on Soviet naval construction. As I understood the request, the Director also desired to have a brief rundown on the intelligence production activities within the community on this subject.


2. I hope that the enclosed provides basic answers to his inquiries.

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SOVIET NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

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Chart

Organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence	Encl. 1
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SOVIET NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

I. Availability of Intelligence on Soviet Naval Construction.

1. Intelligence information on Soviet naval construction has been constantly diminishing since 1950. This decline is due to [REDACTED] the virtual cessation of the return of prisoners of war.

2. Currently, observational reports are largely limited to attache reports on the Leningrad area, in which about 30 percent of naval production is centered, and to occasional CS reports on the Leningrad and Black Sea areas. Soviet efforts to cover their naval shipbuilding efforts, by closing of principal production centers to travel and by housing of construction in covered ways and by screening of open ways, is reducing the value of observational reports.

4. Unless new sources of information become available, future estimates of naval construction will necessarily be based on past production, capabilities derived from detailed studies of facilities, and estimated intentions.

II. Estimated Production of Soviet Naval Vessels, 1952-55.

1. ONI provides information on Soviet naval construction by listing new vessels placed in operation with the Soviet Fleet together with a description of the vessel's characteristics. CIA/ORR, on the other hand, provides information on annual production, reported in standard displacement tons and by numbers and types of vessels, which is a measure of the economic effort expended. There is close agreement between CIA/ORR production estimates and ONI information regarding new vessels placed in operation.

2. A brief tabulation of estimated Soviet naval production, 1952-55, made by CIA/ORR follows:

Soviet Naval Production

<u>Type of Vessel</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
Cruiser	3	3	3	2
Destroyer	19	17	18	12
Submarine	18	28	62	91
Minesweeper	20	20	20	20
PT			50	50

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**III. Production of Intelligence on Soviet Naval Construction
in the US Intelligence Community.**

1. In the US intelligence community, ONI, CIA/OPR, and APOIN all produce intelligence on Soviet naval construction. In ONI, three Branches of the Intelligence Production Division (see the chart, Encl. 1) are concerned with production for Subsection E (Shipbuilding) under Section G (Manufacturing and Construction) of NIS 26 (USSR) and in preparing estimates of numbers and characteristics of new construction of Soviet naval vessels becoming operational.

2. In CIA/OPR the Shipbuilding Branch, Industrial Division (Economic Research Area), does research in depth on the economic aspects of Soviet naval construction. These studies take the form of detailed yard studies of facilities and over-all country studies of naval and merchant construction slanted toward capabilities, inputs, and the impact on the economy of current construction.

3. APOIN produces intelligence on shipbuilding capabilities in connection with Air Target studies.

4. An EIC Subcommittee on Shipbuilding was formed in May 1955. Its primary work to date has been in defining research and collection deficiencies and in the development of an agreed methodology for estimating shipyard capability. Interagency working relationships are very good.

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